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1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the development of the legal framework for renewable energy in 
Russia and discusses the current state of renewable energy in the country. The Russian 
support scheme for renewable energy is elaborated in detail for both the wholesale and retail 
energy markets, and the outcomes of the policy are assessed based on the current state of 
renewable energy in Russia.
Russia has introduced an unusual scheme to promote renewable energy: compensating 
investments in capacity installed and guaranteeing investors a certain return on their invest-
ments. This instrument is known in the literature as a ‘capacity-based mechanism’ or simply 
a ‘capacity mechanism’. The capacity mechanism also imposes some restrictions and incen-
tives to motivate renewable-energy production and attempts to minimise the cost burden of 
the subsidies on the taxpayer. Renewable-energy investments in other countries are com-
monly supported by paying projects for the electricity produced, rather than the installed 
capacity. The Russian approach has practical relevance from the policymakers’ perspective 
because, in contrast to conventional power plants that can be operated non-stop to produce 
electricity, many forms of renewable energy are not able to guarantee production on com-
mand. Paying for actual electricity production encourages investors to select appropriate sites 
for renewable energy generation. However, the Russian case demonstrates that renewables 
can also be supported through installed capacity. 
In this chapter, we review the academic literature on Russian renewable energy policy, 
present a short overview of the various changes in policy and analyse the outcomes of the 
policy in terms of the current state of renewable energy in Russia, paying particular attention 
to the effect of the capacity mechanism. 
2 Existing research on renewable energy in Russia
In this section, we provide an overview of studies focusing on both the regulatory aspects of 
renewables and on the investment climate for renewable energy in Russia. We cover mainly 
the period 2008–2019, as the legal framework for renewables in Russia changed significantly 
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during that period, and the older literature is not so relevant any more. However, we also 
touch on some of the older works that are of particular interest.
The significant potential for renewable energy in Russia has been highlighted repeatedly 
in the literature. Among the early studies, Martinot1 analysed market barriers for broad 
renewable-energy deployment in Russia and emphasised the importance of institutional 
incentives and market intermediation. Later, Martinot outlined and discussed business mod-
els for renewable energy that are also competitive without financial support, such as hybrid 
wind-diesel and biomass power plants for small settlements.2 Joint ventures with foreign cor-
porations are presented as tools to overcome some existing barriers and facilitate knowledge 
and technology transfer.3
In their book, Overland and Kjaernet4 explore the potential for international cooperation 
in Russia’s renewable-energy sector, focusing mostly on EU-Russian and Nordic-Russian 
partnerships. Based on extensive data gathered through interviews and field trips, the book 
presents a thorough analysis of both Russian strengths in the renewable-energy sector and 
barriers to the sector’s development in Russia. 
The first in-depth analysis of the Russian capacity mechanism is based on the pre- 
enactment legislative draft and was carried out by Boute,5 who at the time of writing acted 
as a legal adviser to the Russia Renewable Energy Program of the International Finance 
Corporation/World Bank. His article highlights the uniqueness of the choice to support re-
newable energy through capacity remuneration rather than by supporting electricity output, as 
is common in other support schemes around the world. Boute shows that the capacity-based 
approach possesses stand-alone benefits, including more predictable cash flows for the inves-
tors and a reduced incentive to supply electricity to the grid during periods of low demand. 
Boute warns of the potential problems of a capacity-based mechanism with regard to 
properly accounting for the typically variable electricity output from renewable energy 
projects. Conventional energy power plants can produce electricity throughout the year, 
whereas wind and solar power are dependent on the weather. Capacity-based support should 
be adjusted so that it does not favour the construction of renewable energy projects in loca-
tions with low resource availability or the building of plants that are left idle, leading to the 
waste of taxpayers’ money. In this vein, Boute reviews the international experiences of how 
the variable electricity output of renewable energy has been handled in different capacity 
markets. 
After the introduction of the law governing the Russian renewable-energy support mech-
anism for the wholesale market in 2013, the scholars showed a growing interest in Russian 
renewable-energy policy, and the volume of research surged (Figure 12.1). 
 1 ‘Energy eff iciency and renewable energy in Russia: Transaction barriers, market intermediation, and capacity 
building’ (1998) 26(11) Energy Policy 905
 2 E. Martinot. ‘Renewable energy in Russia: Markets, development and technology transfer’ (1999) 3(1) Renew-
able and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49; Indra Overland. ‘The Siberian Curse: A blessing in disguise for renew-
able energy?’ (2010) 9(2) Sibirica 1
 3 E. Martinot, ‘Renewable energy in Russia: Markets, development and technology transfer’ (1999) 3(1) Renew-
able and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49
 4 Russian Renewable Energy: The Potential for International Cooperation (Routledge, 2009)
 5 ‘Promoting renewable energy through capacity markets: An analysis of the Russian support scheme’ (2012) 
46(0) Energy Policy 68
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In his book,6 Boute presents a comprehensive overview and analysis of Russian electricity 
and energy-investment law. Vasilieva et al.7 analyse the effect of the renewable-energy sup-
port mechanism on the prices of electricity and capacity in Russia and show that the effect 
is modest. 
A description of the Russian capacity mechanism is provided by Kozlova and Collan,8 
who provide the first comprehensive presentation of the renewable-energy capacity price 
calculation procedure published in English. The paper presents the results of a numerical 
analysis of the effect of the Russian capacity mechanism for renewable energy investments on 
investment profitability. The results of this analysis indicate that the mechanism can reduce 
market risks for investors. The paper also discusses the requirements of the mechanism that 
steer investments towards capital costs control and the limits that the mechanism has on pay-
ing out subsidies. The capacity mechanism is crucial to enable renewable-energy investments 
at the wholesale market level as, without support, these investments would be unprofitable.9 
Smeets10 analyses the first two-year period of factual implementation of the capacity 
mechanism. The evidence suggests that investors were reluctant to offer wind-power proj-
ects in the first capacity auctions, whereas solar PV projects were offered actively. The rea-
sons proposed by Smeets for the reluctance to offer wind-power investments include: (i) lack 
of local wind-turbine manufacturing facilities, which makes it impossible to meet the local 
 6 Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law, Volume 65 (Brill, 2015)
 7 Evgeniia Vasileva et al., ‘RES support in Russia: Impact on capacity and electricity market prices’ (2015) 76(0) 
Renewable Energy 82
 8 ‘Modeling the effects of the new Russian capacity mechanism on renewable energy investments’ (2016) 95 
Energy Policy 350
 9 Mariia Kozlova, Mikael Collan and Pasi Luukka, ‘Russian mechanism to support renewable energy invest-
ments: before and after analysis’ in P. Diez et al. Computational Methods and Models for Transport. Computational 
Methods in Applied Sciences, Vol. 45 (Springer, 2017) 243
 10 ‘Similar goals, divergent motives. The enabling and constraining factors of Russia’s capacity-based renewable 
energy support scheme’ (2017) 101 Energy Policy 138
Figure 12.1  Documents per year in Scopus, TITLE-ABS-KEY (“renewable energy” AND Russia 
AND (policy OR law OR investment))a
Source: Scopus bibliography statistics, modified by authors.
a SCOPUS bibliography statistics, modified by authors
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content requirement of the capacity mechanism; (ii) depreciation of the rouble, which made 
the foreign share of capital costs too expensive; (iii) the possible bias of the design of the 
support mechanism in favour of solar power (the latter was shown not to be the case by the 
results of the four subsequent capacity auctions discussed in this chapter). Smeets11 also shows 
that both the wind and solar projects selected through the auctions were later delayed. 
The monograph by Boute12 also covers the first two-year period of the implementation 
of the capacity mechanism. The limited success of the first auction is explained by the short 
timespan between the activation of the support mechanism and the auction, which left in-
sufficient time for investors to prepare the required documentation. This study suggests that 
another reason for the partial failure of the two first auctions was simply the lack of investor 
confidence in the new scheme. 
Lanshina et al.13 emphasise the continuing gap between regulation and implementation 
of renewable-energy support in Russia, arguing that this is because fossil fuels constitute the 
main revenue of the Russian government and, thus, have priority for the Russian authorities. 
However, Smeets14 argues that Russia’s intention to remain an important energy exporter 
was a driving force for the development of the renewable-energy sector. Here there is an 
interesting parallel to the Arab Gulf states, though the Arabs went much further in the devel-
opment of renewable energy than the Russians.15 The United Arab Emirates, in particular, 
launched some of the world’s largest solar-power projects, helping drive down the price of 
solar panels globally.16
Unlike the capacity mechanism, the electricity tariff scheme for retail markets intro-
duced in Russia in 2015 has not received much academic attention. Boute17 discusses the 
role of the regional authorities in developing renewable energy and analyses the barriers in 
the regulatory framework, one of them being the centralisation of political power. Boute18 
briefly reviews the legal prerequisites for the implementation of the scheme. Kozlova et al.19 
concisely present the newly introduced scheme and highlight the differences and similarities 
it has with the capacity mechanism. No detailed qualitative or quantitative studies have been 
carried out that focus on the retail-market support mechanism.
Finally, Russia has been found to have substantial renewable-energy potential, especially 
in remote areas where renewables are profitable without any support, mostly because they 
can function as substitutes for fossil fuels that must be transported great distances in small 
 11 ibid
 12 Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Volume 65 Brill, 2015)
 13 ‘The slow expansion of renewable energy in Russia: Competitiveness and regulation issues’ (2018) 120 Energy 
Policy 600
 14 ‘The Green Menace: Unraveling Russia’s elite discourse on enabling and constraining factors of renewable 
energy policies’ (2018) 40 Energy Research & Social Science 244
 15 A. H. Almasoud and Hatim M. Gandayh, ‘Future of solar energy in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 27 Journal of King Saud 
University – Engineering Sciences 153
 16 M. Jamil, Farzana Ahmad and Y. J. Jeon. ‘Renewable energy technologies adopted by the UAE: Prospects 
and challenges – A comprehensive overview’ (2016) 55 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1181; Sgouris 
Sgouridis et al. ‘RE-mapping the UAE’s energy transition: An economy-wide assessment of renewable energy 
options and their policy implications’ (2016) 55 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1166
 17 ‘Renewable energy federalism in Russia: Regions as new actors for the promotion of clean energy’ (2013) 25(2) 
Journal of Environmental Law 261–291
 18 Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Volume 65 Brill, 2015)
 19 ‘Renewable energy in emerging economies: Shortly analyzing the Russian incentive mechanisms for re-
newable energy investments’ (International Research Conference ‘GSOM Emerging Markets Conference – 
2015: Business and government perspectives’ Saint Petersburg, Russia 2015)
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volumes at a high cost.20 Boute21 reviews the legal framework for supporting renewables in 
remote areas and focuses on hybrid wind and solar-diesel power in the Russian Arctic. Based 
on his review of the international experience and compatibility with Russian law, he sug-
gests several alternative support mechanisms. Centralised policy coordination is noted to be 
an important requirement for such support. 
3 Russian renewable-energy law and support mechanisms overview
Russia introduced a renewable-energy development strategy in 2009 (Energy Strategy of 
Russia to 2030).22 The strategy sets a target of producing 4.5 per cent of electricity from re-
newable energy sources by 2020. The first real steps towards this target were taken four years 
later, with the introduction of the renewables support mechanism for the wholesale market.23 
Prior to this, the strategy was considered a failure.24 However, two years later, amendments 
to the support scheme were introduced, triggering new investments in renewable energy.25 
The Russian government also introduced a renewable-energy support scheme for retail 
markets.26 This scheme provides a central tariff calculation methodology and delegates the 
responsibility for supportive measures to the regional energy authorities. The first two years 
after it was introduced, there were no projects under the scheme.27 One reason given was the 
reluctance of the regional energy authorities to work out the regulatory framework for the 
support-mechanism procedures and formulate the actual contracts that would guarantee in-
vestors the promised tariff payments. However, by the end of 2018 there have been a couple 
of dozen small projects implemented under this scheme, however, their contribution to the 
overall Russian energy system is negligible.28 
For all practical purposes, there has been no centralised support mechanism for renew-
able energy projects in remote areas and isolated energy systems.29 This makes some sense 
insofar as renewable energy should be commercially viable without special support mecha-
nisms in many areas. Conversely, a support mechanism could still be useful to help get the 
ball rolling on renewable-energy developments across Russia’s vast northern and eastern 
 20 P. Lombardi et al., ‘Isolated power system in Russia: A chance for renewable energies?’ (2016) 90 Renewable 
Energy 532; Z. B. Namsaraev, A. M. Konovalov and G. V. Baturova. ‘Study of feasibility of local renewable 
resources for substitution of fossil fuels in the Far North of Russia’ (IOP Conference Series: Earth and Envi-
ronmental Science, IOP Publishing, 2018) 012022; Indra Overland. ‘The Siberian Curse: A blessing in disguise 
for renewable energy?’ (2010) 9(2) Sibirica 1
 21 ‘Off-grid renewable energy in remote Arctic areas: An analysis of the Russian Far East’ (2016) 59 Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews 1029
 22 8 January 2009 Resolution #1-r on the main directions for the state policy to improve the energy eff iciency of 
the electricity sector on the basis of renewable energy sources for the period up to 2020 
 23 28 May 2013 Decree #449 on the mechanism of promoting the use of renewable energy in the wholesale 
market of electric energy and power 2013 
 24 Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Volume 65 Brill, Boston 2015)
 25 10 November 2015 Decree #1210 on the introduction of amendments to the certain legislative acts regarding 
the use of renewable energy sources in the wholesale electricity and capacity market 2015 
 26 23 January 2015 Decree #47 on amendments to some legislative acts of the Russian Federation on promotion 
of use of renewable energy sources in retail electricity markets 2015 
 27 A. Zhiharev, ‘Renewable energy support on retail markets: Wake-up call’ (in Russian). (2017) report by 
VYGON Consulting 36
 28 Tatiana A. Lanshina et al. ‘The slow expansion of renewable energy in Russia: Competitiveness and regulation 
issues’ (2018) 120 Energy Policy 600
 29 Anatole Boute. ‘Off-grid renewable energy in remote Arctic areas: An analysis of the Russian Far East’ (2016) 
59 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1029
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territories. Such developments could, in turn, provide the basis for embryonic markets for 
renewable-energy equipment and services, which could later be built on as renewable energy 
spreads to the rest of the country.30 Nevertheless, some regions have taken the matter into 
their own hands, developing local renewables by either supporting them with regional funds 
released from diesel purchasing31 or by implementing over-sophisticated financing mecha-
nisms for energy performance contracting.32 
3.1 Wholesale market support
The support mechanism for the wholesale market introduced in 201333 differs from renew-
able energy support schemes in the rest of the world. The Russian scheme originates in the 
capacity trading system of the Russian energy market. Unlike the electricity-only markets 
that most countries have, Russia has two commodities in one market, electricity and ca-
pacity. By selling capacity, electricity producers pledge that their plants will be available 
to produce electricity in the future. All wholesale market electricity buyers are obliged to 
buy a certain amount of capacity corresponding to their peak consumption. This way of 
organising the market allows for stability in electricity prices, and provides more reliability 
to the short and long-term electricity supply by providing less risky revenues for investors. 
Some other countries organise their markets in a similar way,34 and some of these markets 
have adopted rules for allowing renewables to participate in the capacity trade.35 However, 
the Russian case is the first one in which the capacity trade principle has been used as the 
foundation for creating a renewable-energy support scheme, rather than supporting renew-
ables with other schemes and simultaneously trying to integrate them into capacity trade as 
in other jurisdictions. 
In the Russian system, planned investment projects are submitted as bids to capacity auc-
tions. The mechanism was set up to conduct annual capacity auctions during the seven-year 
period 2013–2019. Each auction is used as a mechanism to select the renewable-energy capac-
ity to be installed for the coming four-year period. A total of over 7GW of renewable-energy 
capacity was planned for construction in Russia by 2024, including 4.4GW of wind power, 
1.8GW of solar power and 0.9GW of small hydro power. Selected projects were to benefit 
 30 Indra Overland. ‘The Siberian Curse: A Blessing in Disguise for Renewable Energy?’ (2010) 9(2) Sibirica 1
 31 Margarita Nifontova. ‘Vozobnovlyaemaya energetika Yakutii, uravnenie so vsemi izvestnymi [Renewables of 
Yakutia, equation with all known]’ (2019) www.1sn.ru/225334.html
 32 N. Zhabin. ‘Kamchatka planiruet sozdat’ energouzel iz malyh GES na vostoke poluostrova [Kamchatka is plan-
ning to create a hydropower generation center in the East of the peninsula]’ neftegaz.ru (2019) https://neftegaz.
ru/news/energy/194234-kamchatka-planiruet-sozdat-energouzel-iz-malykh-ges-na-vostoke-poluostrova 
 33 28 May 2013 Decree #449 on the mechanism of promoting the use of renewable energy in the wholesale 
market of electric energy and power 2013 
 34 Christian Held and Jan Ole Voss. ‘Legal limits for electricity capacity markets in the EU and Germany’ (2013) 4 
Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 245; Benjamin F. Hobbs et al. ‘A dynamic analysis of a demand curve-
based capacity market proposal: The PJM reliability pricing model’ (2007) 22(1) IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems 3–14; B. Tennbakk et al. ‘Capacity mechanisms in individual markets within the IEM’ (2013) https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20130207_generation_adequacy_study.pdf
 35 Sergio Botero, Felipe Isaza and Adriana Valencia. ‘Evaluation of methodologies for remunerating wind pow-
er’s reliability in Colombia’ (2010) 14(7) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2049; Cynthia Bothwell 
and Benjamin F. Hobbs. ‘Crediting wind and solar renewables in electricity capacity markets: The effects of 
alternative definitions upon market eff iciency’ (2017) 38 (KAPSARC Special Issue) The Energy Journal; Seyed 
Hossein Madaeni, Ramteen Sioshansi and Paul Denholm. ‘Comparing capacity value estimation techniques 
for photovoltaic solar power’ (2013) 3(1) IEEE Journal of Photovoltaics 407
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from capacity payments for 15 years. The selection criterion in the auction is based on in-
vestment cost, and only the lowest investment cost projects are selected for subsidisation. 
Investment cost limits are set for each technology separately. The projects are obliged to use 
a prespecified share of locally produced equipment; this is called a localisation requirement. 
In the case of a project failing to fulfil the localisation requirement, the subsidy is to be sub-
stantially reduced, possibly making the investment unprofitable.36 
However, if a project shows compliance with the rules and high performance, its prof-
itability is secured even in the presence of a changing market. The remuneration in terms 
of capacity price is aimed at a 12 per cent return on investment. The compliance is checked 
for each project individually, project-specific factors include the project investment costs, 
localisation of equipment and an annually checked electricity-production performance (the 
capacity factor). If the average achieved capacity factor is lower than the pre-set target, the 
remuneration amount for that year is lowered. The critical capacity factor levels are 20 per 
cent for wind, 10 per cent for solar and 28 per cent for small hydro. This way, the capacity 
mechanism incorporates the variability of electricity production into the capacity-based sup-
port instrument. The capacity price is also annually adjusted based on electricity price vari-
ation, inflation and interest rates. This trait of the capacity mechanism reduces market risk 
for investors, but also ensures the cost-efficiency of the policy by avoiding over- subisidisation 
during favourable times. 
In the first version of the mechanism, the requirements for small hydro and wind power 
appeared to be too strict. Few projects were offered in the first auctions. To solve this prob-
lem, the government introduced amendments with relaxed investment-cost limits and local-
isation requirements for small hydro and wind power projects.37 
The next section studies the outcome of the implementation of the Russian support 
scheme for renewable energy investments and, in particular, the effects of the aforemen-
tioned amendments. 
3.1.1 Retail markets support
The capacity trade is limited to the wholesale market; therefore, another support mechanism 
had to be developed for the retail level. The tariff scheme that was introduced is a combina-
tion of a feed-in tariff scheme (in which projects are remunerated per unit of electricity pro-
duced), a tendering scheme (in which projects compete for funds) and a capacity mechanism 
(which is embedded in the tariff calculation and guarantees a certain return on investment).38 
Demand for electricity generated from renewable sources is supported by obliging the 
electricity-distribution companies to compensate losses in the grid, primarily by using 
 renewable-energy sources. Another principle of the scheme is that the tariff applied varies 
by region, as it is calculated based on competing investment costs and electricity-production 
performance. The rate of return on investment, and thus tariff in monetary terms, is cal-
culated by taking the minimum of the pre-set limit and the project-specific planned in-
vestment costs. A similar principle is applied to the capacity factor; the maximums of the 
 36 Mariia Kozlova and Mikael Collan. ‘Modeling the effects of the new Russian capacity mechanism on renew-
able energy investments’ (2016) 95 Energy Policy 350
 37 10 November 2015 Decree #1210 on the introduction of amendments to the certain legislative acts regarding 
the use of renewable energy sources in the wholesale electricity and capacity market 2015 
 38 23 January 2015 Decree #47 on amendments to some legislative acts of the Russian Federation on promotion 
of the use of renewable energy sources in retail electricity markets 2015 
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pre-set capacity factor and a planned project-specific capacity factor are used. This feature 
potentially accounts for differences in investment profitability due to differing access to 
equipment-manufacturing facilities and the availability of renewable resources in different 
locations. 
An important feature of this scheme is that it supports only wind, solar PV and small 
hydro investments. The regional tariffs are designed for a wider variety of renewable energy 
sources, also including geothermal, biomass and some other forms of renewable energy. 
Although the overall principles and the tariff-calculation methodology are established by 
central laws, the implementation of the scheme is delegated to the regional authorities. This 
is both an enabling39 and a constraining factor.40 The regional authorities can potentially 
develop renewable-energy more effectively than the central authorities because they have a 
more direct interest in local economic and technological development.41 However, the lack 
of a more detailed regulatory framework and support procedures at the regional level is one 
reason for the slow implementation of the scheme42 
4 Current situation of renewable energy in Russia
In this section, we present the outcome of Russian renewable-energy regulation in terms of 
existing and planned renewable energy projects. First, we discuss the results of the capacity 
auctions, followed by some data on all the operational renewable energy projects in Russia. 
4.1 Renewable energy projects on the wholesale market
The capacity mechanism discussed above enabled renewables to enter the Russian electricity 
wholesale market. The results of the capacity auctions reflect the growing role of renewables 
in the wholesale market and the success of the scheme. However, the specific annual targets 
for renewable-energy capacity to be built have not been reached as originally planned (see 
Table 12.1). 
Approximately 90 per cent of the targeted renewable energy capacity has been selected in 
the auctions, with an 80 per cent shortfall for small hydro, a 10 per cent shortfall for wind and 
a 20 per cent overshoot of the target for solar power. Underperformance was concentrated in 
the first auctions (2013–2014) and was due to the short time available to prepare for the first 
auction after the announcement of the support mechanism in 2013 and, as mentioned above, 
overly strict cost limits and localisation requirements for wind and small hydro power, which 
were relaxed just before the 2015 auction. 
Solar projects have benefited from the existence of domestic manufacturers, making it 
easier to meet local content requirements43 and, therefore, reach the targets in 2015. The 
situation for wind power and small hydro is different. It appears that the capital cost limits 
 39 Anatole Boute. ‘Renewable energy federalism in Russia: Regions as new actors for the promotion of clean 
energy’ (2013) 25(2) Journal of Environmental Law 261–291
 40 A. Zhiharev, ‘Renewable energy support on retail markets: wake-up call’ (in Russian). VYGON Consulting 
(2017) 
 41 Anatole Boute. ‘Renewable energy federalism in Russia: Regions as new actors for the promotion of clean 
energy’ (2013) Journal of Environmental Law
 42 A. Zhiharev, ‘Renewable energy support on retail markets: wake-up call’ (in Russian). VYGON Consulting 
(2017)
 43 Niels Smeets. ‘Similar goals, divergent motives. The enabling and constraining factors of Russia’s capacity- 
based renewable energy support scheme’ (2017) 101 Energy Policy 138
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and localisation requirements were too strict for these technologies initially.44 Only after the 
aforementioned amendments in 201545 were more projects offered in auctions. This resulted 
in reaching the targets for installed wind capacity as from 2019 and an increase in installed 
small hydro as from 2021. The reason for the later fulfilment of the small hydro targets is the 
longer lead times for their design and construction. 
It is also important to understand what happens at the auctions. How many, how big and 
by whom were the bids? We start the discussion by looking at the average size of the projects 
submitted in different years; see Figure 12.2.
The first auction saw relatively small projects. From the investor perspective, it made 
sense to first test the new and unfamiliar system with smaller projects and tie up less capital. 
As they gained confidence, investors proposed increasingly large-scale projects. The average 
capacity has had a steady upward trend over the years, except for the last auctions in 2018 
and 2019. A number of factors, including the chosen site and land limitations, electricity 
demand, grid conditions, and so on, affect project size. The decreased average size of the 
projects proposed in 2018 and 2019 could be a sign that the various factors are reaching an 
equilibrium. With respect to wind-power investments, there were 19 relatively large proj-
ects of 38–39 MW each, but also six projects of 20 MW and one smaller 10 MW wind farm 
selected in 2018 and one huge 71 MW project in 2019. The size of solar power projects in 
the same year varies from 5–24 MW. The comparatively small size of hydro power projects 
 44 ibid
 45 10 November 2015 Decree #1210 on the introduction of amendments to the certain legislative acts regarding 
the use of renewable energy sources in the wholesale electricity and capacity market 2015 
Table 12.1  Renewable-energy capacity targeted and auctioned by the planned years of commercialisation
Type Capacity 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total
Wind target, MW 100 250 250 500 750 500 500 500 500 500 76 3600*
auctioned, MW 0 0 50 90 200 509 640 738 530 498 71 3326
  auctioned, % 0 0 20 18 27 102 128 148 106 100 94 92
Solar target, MW 120 140 200 250 270 270 270 163 163 0 0 1520
auctioned, MW 35 140 199 255 285 309 295 178 163 - - 1858
  auctioned, % 29 100 100 102 106 114 109 109 100 - - 122
Hydro target, MW 18 26 124 124 141 159 159 36 36 36 0 751
auctioned, MW 0 0 0 21 0 50 16 25 33 24 - 168
  auctioned, % 0 0 0 17 0 31 10 70 93 67 - 22
Total target, MW 238 416 574 874 1161 929 929 698 698 536 76 5871
auctioned, MW 35 140 249 366 485 867 951 941 726 521 71 5352
  auctioned, % 15 34 43 42 42 93 102 135 104 97 94 91
Source: Computed by the authors based on publicly available results of the renewable energy auctions)a
a Total target installed capacity is less than the sum of annual target volumes, it is the initially set 
objective of the policy according to the Government of Russian Federation 28 May 2013 Resolution 
#861-r on amendments being made to Resolution #1-r 8.01.2009 on the main directions for the state policy 
to improve the energy efficiency of the electricity sector on the basis of renewable energy sources for the period up 
to 2020 (2013). The annual target volumes for later auctions were pushed higher to compensate for 
under-selection of earlier auctions.
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could be explained by the fact that they are proffered by companies that are new to the ca-
pacity auctions and are testing the waters. Often, a company will offer several projects in an 
auction, representing the consecutive construction stages of one larger, renewable-energy 
power plant. 
The breakdown of the auction results by the number of selected bids indicates that there 
is great year-to-year variability in the volumes and types of projects; see Figure 12.3. 
There are years with zero projects of a certain kind. For hydro and wind power, this can 
indicate that the requirements for capital costs and localisation are too strict. For solar, the 
opposite is the case; an overly successful auction the preceding year causes the administrator 
to restrict participation because the (longer-term) target capacity has already been reached. 
Only one project with each technology type was selected in the last 2019 auction, as the 
target capacities for the later years of the scheme had already been fulfilled.
Figure 12.4 shows the number of companies that participated in the capacity auctions. 
In total, about 20 different companies have participated in the scheme with the majority of 
them being involved in the solar-power sector. The entire list of companies and their shares 




















Figure 12.3  Number of projects per auction year
Source: Computed by the authors based on the publicly available results of the renewable energy auctions, available 






















Figure 12.2  Average capacity of projects per auction year
Source: Computed by the authors based on the publicly available results of the renewable energy auctions, available 




The Russian wind-power sector is made up of a mix of Russian state-owned companies, 
foreign investors and Russian–foreign partnerships. The market leader is the Finnish com-
pany Fortum, followed by the Russian company VetroOGK (which along with VetroOGK-2 
is part of the ROSATOM Group, which is mainly engaged in nuclear power). Vetroparki 
FRV is a joint company created by Fortum and RUSNANO, and it won capacity agreements 
for 24 wind farm projects with a combined capacity of 823 MW in the 2018 auction. The 
secret of their success is the achievement of the local content requirement and lower capital 
costs. This was made possible by a new Russian wind-turbine manufacturer founded by 
a partnership of RUSNANO and the Danish company Vestas,46 the world’s leading wind 
turbine manufacturer.47 The wind farms are to be commissioned during the period 2019–
2023. Both ROSATOM and RUSNANO are government-owned companies. Another en-
trant in the Russian wind-tech manufacturing market is German–Spanish Siemens Gamesa 
 46 RUSNANO. ‘Fond ROSNANO i Fortum poluchil pravo stroitelstva 823 MW vetrogeneracii [Fund of 
RUSNANO and Fortum received the right to construct 823 MW of windpower]’ Press release (2018) 
 47 REN21, ‘Renewables 2018 Global Status Report’ (2019) www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
06/17-8652_GSR2018_FullReport_web_-1.pdf 
Table 12.2  List of companies that have participated in the auctions
Technology type Companies Origin
Share of the auctioned capacity of that 
technology type, %
Wind Fortum energy Finland 30
VetroOGK Russia 29
Vetroparki FRV Russia & 
Finland
25















Figure 12.4  Number of companies per auction year
Source: Computed by the authors based on the publicly available results of the renewable energy auctionsa
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(the world’s second-largest wind turbine manufacturer),48 which won its first Russian con-
tract to supply wind turbines for the Russian projects of Italian company Enel in 2017.49
In terms of the timeline, the first mover was KomplexIndustriya with a total 105 MW of 
wind-power projects offered in the 2013 auction. The second mover was Finnish Fortum, 
which seemingly tested the support scheme with 35 MW in 2015 and then offered a whopping 
1,000 MW in 2017. The rest of the wind projects were submitted in the period 2016–2018.
A quarter of the solar power market is in the hands of Avelar Solar Technology, a subsidi-
ary of the largest Russian solar panel manufacturer, Hevel Solar, founded by politician Ana-
toly Chubais and businessman Viktor Vekselberg, both Russian. Foreign investors involved 
in the Russian solar sector include Solar Systems founded by the Chinese Amur Sirius Power 
Equipment, Kazakh Green Energy and Finnish Fortum. A large Russian manufacturer of 
transformer stations and other electrical equipment, ElectronMash, which has been supply-
ing electrical equipment to the solar projects of Avelar and the wind projects of Vetroparki 
FRV, is now constructing a solar-panel manufacturing plant.50
 48 ibid
 49 Siemens Gameza. ‘Press release: Siemens Gamesa enters Russia with its f irst order for 90-MW Enel wind farm’ 
(2018) https://www.siemensgamesa.com/newsroom/2018/10/20181005-enters-russia-with-its-f irst-order-
for-90-mw-enel-wind-farm
 50 Aleksey Dmitriev. ‘Solnechnaya ekonomika. Peterburgskiy Electronmash zapuskaet proizvodstvo ustanovok 
solnechnyh elektrostanciy [Solar economy. Saint Petersburg’s Electronmash starts manufacturing solar panels]’ 
dp.ru (2018) https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3306333
Technology type Companies Origin
Share of the auctioned capacity of that 
technology type, %
Solar Avelar Solar Technology Russia 25
Green Energy Rus Kazakhstan 16
MRC Energoholding Russia 13
Solar Systems China 12
T Plus Russia 11
KomplexIndustriya Russia 11
Fortum Finland 6





Krasnoyarskaya GES Russia 0.3







Source: Computed by the authors based on the publicly available results of the renewable energy auctionsa




The bids for solar power projects are more evenly distributed among different companies 
than the bids for wind and hydropower projects, with the first two auctions receiving bids 
from five companies each (Figure 12.4).
Small hydro is the smallest renewable energy type in terms of installed capacity (see 
Table 12.1) and is represented by three Russian companies and one Ukrainian company. 
RusHydro and NGBP started to participate in the auctions early, in 2014 and 2015. Yuzhen-
ergostroy and EnergoMIN entered the arena in 2018. 
These results concern the auctioned renewable-energy projects. Many of them were to 
start delivering electricity to the grid by 2020. The list of renewable energy projects qualified 
by the Russian energy authorities51 reveals substantial delays in the building of the power 
plants. Only 60 per cent of projects that were supposed to have been built were completed as 
of January 2020. Figure 12.5 shows the breakdown of the projects in terms of length of delay. 
The brick pattern indicates already-built projects, whereas the others are still not constructed 
as of January 2020. 
Only 25 per cent of all planned projects were built on time and in accordance with the 
initial submission dates. The projects that have been constructed on time are the 19 solar 
projects of Avelar Solar Technology, 3 of T Plus and 1 belonging to Orenburgskaya gener-
iruyushaya kompaniya. Even if the capacity auctions were quite successful for solar power 
generation, some companies have struggled to realise their plans. Komplexindustriya has not 
even started the construction of its solar-power projects in the Belgorod and Lipetsk regions, 
which were originally scheduled for completion in 2015–2016. Possible reasons behind these 
delays are poor planning of projects and unachievable, overly ambitious low capital costs.52 
In total, 31 solar projects have been built with delays, and 25 have not been built. Three 
 51 NP Market Council. ‘Vozobnovlyaemye istochniki energii. Perechen’ kvalif icirovannyh ob’ektov [Renewable 
energy sources. The list of the qualif ied objects]’ https://www.np-sr.ru/ru/market/vie/index.htm
 52 Alexander Chizhenok. ‘KomplexIndustriya pogasla v Lipecke i Belgorode [KomplexIndustriya faded out in 




















Figure 12.5  Delays in commissioning renewable energy projects
Source: Computed by the authors based on the publicly available results of the renewable energy auctionsa and the 
registry of constructed projectsb
a Trading System Administrator. ‘Renewable energy auction results (available only in Russian)’ <www.atsenergo.
ru/vie/proresults/index.htm>
b NP Market Council. ‘Vozobnovlyaemye istochniki energii. Perechen’ kvalificirovannyh ob’ektov (Renewable 
energy sources. The list of the qualified objects)’ <https://www.np-sr.ru/ru/market/vie/index.htm>
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small hydro power stations by RusHydro were planned to start operating in 2017 and were 
yet to be built as of January 2020. This was surprising given that RusHydro is a large and 
well-established actor, and the technology is well-known and simple. Two 25 MW wind 
projects by Fortum have been built on schedule and one 35 MW project with a minor de-
lay, whereas 7 Komplexindustriya projects planned to start in 2016–2017 still had not been 
launched as of January 2020. The local media reported that the company was planning to 
sell the rights to build these windfarms. From 2019, the owner of these rights had to start 
paying monthly delay fees.53
The messy documentation of project implementation makes it difficult to get an overview.54 
In some cases, the owner of a power plant changes during the construction period and so a new 
one is specified in the list of built projects, but such changes reflect reality. However, errors in 
some project specifications, e.g., titles and in some cases even identification numbers, make it 
unnecessarily difficult to get an overview of the situation. Surprisingly, the list of completed 
renewable energy power plants includes 18 solar projects with a combined capacity of 235 MW 
that were never selected through the capacity auctions for the specified regions, though they have 
been assigned ID numbers under the capacity mechanism. It is possible that those projects were 
built to substitute for other projects that were abandoned somewhere else, but the publicly avail-
able documentation does not make it possible to confirm or deny this.
Even if the capacity mechanism for renewable energy was not been as successful as origi-
nally intended, it has boosted the development of the renewable-energy sector in Russia and 
also attracted foreign investors. However, the capacity mechanism ended with its last auction 
in 2019 and the last renewables to be built under the mechanism should be completed by 
2025. Its prolongation is a subject of current political debate.55 Anatoly Chubais argues that 
renewable energy investment in Russia will dry up if the support is discontinued. We think 
this is probably correct, unless a major Russian oil, gas or nuclear company decides to launch 
renewable projects of its own accord to keep up with international developments and emu-
late international peers. For broader development of the Russian renewable-energy sector, it 
is critical that the capacity mechanism is prolonged beyond 2025.
It is informative to contrast the role of foreign investors in the Russian renewables sector 
with their role in the Russian petroleum sector. In the latter, the law on strategic assets passed 
in 2008 bars foreign oil companies from taking on a dominant role in the development of oil 
and gas fields that are deemed to be strategic because of their size and/or location. However, 
the Russian authorities have also been keen to develop these fields in the hope of securing 
future income for Russia and have, therefore, warmly invited foreign companies to partner 
with their Russian counterparts in the development of such fields, as long as the Russian 
partner remains in control. This has especially been the case in the difficult offshore Arctic 
projects, where foreign companies are expected to contribute important technologies and 
experience from other parts of the Arctic.56 Thus, in the petroleum sector, there is both a 
 53 Tatyana Dyatel and Sergey Titov. ‘Vetryaki menyayut napravlenie [Wind turbines change direction]’ (2018) 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3527423
 54 NP Market Council. ‘Vozobnovlyaemye istochniki energii. Perechen’ kvalif icirovannyh ob’ektov [Renewable 
energy sources. The list of the qualif ied objects]’ https://www.np-sr.ru/ru/market/vie/index.htm
 55 Alina Gubaidulina. ‘Anatoly Chubais: “Esli ne prinyat” reshenie po DPM-2, vozobnovlyaemaya energetika v 
Rossii zachahnet’ [‘Anatoly Chubais: “Without implementing DPM-2, renewable energy in Russia will wither 
away”’]. Realnoe vremya (2018) 
 56 Indra Overland et al., ‘Rosneft’s offshore partnerships: The re-opening of the Russian petroleum frontier?’ 
(2013) 49(249) Polar Record 140–153, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259431566
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push and a pull for foreign companies. By contrast, in the renewables sector, there is neither 
this push nor this pull. Because renewable energy resources are not seen as strategically valu-
able, foreign companies are more welcome to take on whatever roles they would like in their 
development; however, conversely, there is no enthusiasm for the involvement of foreign 
companies in this sector either. As a result, the involvement of foreign companies is much 
more natural and both unhindered and unaided in the renewable energy sector than in the 
petroleum sector in Russia.
4.2 Other renewable energy projects 
The total of installed renewable-energy generation capacity in Russia is almost 3 GW, with 
the projects supported by the capacity mechanism already contributing 40 per cent of this 
figure. Only 2 per cent of the installed renewable-energy capacity is operating as autono-
mous power stations. However, they make up over half of the over 600 renewable-energy 
power plants in the country. Table 12.3 provides an overview of the currently operating 
renewable-energy power plants in Russia.
Table 12.3  Operating renewable energy projects in Russia
Technology type
Wholesale market*


















Solar PV 72 15.19 1072.70 52 12.65 530.94 156 0.02 2.08
Lighthouses***           86 0.00 0.03
Solar PV-diesel       5 0.03 0.13 6 0.10 0.62
Solar 
PV-wind-diesel
      4 0.17 0.68 5 0.03 0.13
Solar PV-wind       4 0.00 0.01 26 0.04 0.41
Wind 3 28.33 85.00 33 6.81 159.83 12 0.17 1.49
Wind-diesel       16 0.02 0.33
Small hydro       148 5.57 784.98      
Geothermal       24 18.84 294.87 7 8.29 58.02
Tidal       6 0.53 3.20      
TOTAL 75 15.72 1158 247 8.76 1774.65 314 0.21 63.12
* The data on wholesale market projects are collected froma the rest of the data are fromb
** Grid-connected, parallel to the grid, reserve, or no data
*** Solar PV panels on lighthouses
a NP Market Council. ‘Vozobnovlyaemye istochniki energii. Perechen’ kvalificirovannyh ob’ektov 
[Renewable energy sources. The list of the qualified objects]’ https://www.np-sr.ru/ru/market/
vie/index.htm
b Research and Educational Center. ‘Renewable Energy’, Geographical Department of Moscow 
State University and Joint Institute for High Temperatures of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
‘GIS renewable energy sources of Russia’. http://gisre.ru
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On the wholesale market level, the participation of renewables is enabled by the ca-
pacity mechanism. Thus, the vast majority of these projects are recent, relatively large, 
with an average installed capacity of 15 MW per project, and so far quite scarce because 
the support mechanism was introduced so recently. Only wind, solar PV and small hydro 
power are supported by the capacity mechanism; therefore, no other types have entered the 
wholesale market. 
Other grid-connected renewable power plants are more diverse in terms of technology 
used. In this group, small hydro, solar PV, geothermal and wind-power plants are present. 
All small hydro power plants in this group were built before the introduction of the capac-
ity mechanism in 2013. The rest of the grid-connected plants include more exotic types of 
power, such as tidal power, and various combinations of solar PV, wind and diesel power 
plants, but their share is small. 
Autonomous renewable power plants include a large proportion of geothermal plants 
with an average size of approximately 8 MW, mostly in the Russian Far East, and a mix 
of small solar PV, wind and various hybrid plants. Such small hybrid power stations are 
the single source of electricity for many remote villages in Russia. Combining solar panels 
and wind turbines with diesel generators can help ensure an uninterrupted power supply.57 
Although autonomous projects constitute a minor share of the total renewable energy in-
stalled capacity in Russia, their number exceeds all other renewable energy power plants. 
Despite the fact that there is no functioning support mechanism for autonomous projects or 
small distributed capacity, this niche seemingly develops without special incentives. How-
ever, more active support from the state could still accelerate the development of them. This 
would save the local authorities money for diesel and its transport, and improve the market 
base for renewable-energy actors in Russia. 
5 Conclusions
In the global renewable energy landscape, the Russian case has a special place because of 
the unique instrument for supporting renewables. Originating in the capacity trade, this 
instrument is meant to secure return on investment for renewable-energy investors. The 
promise of profitable investments theoretically creates a strong incentive for investors to 
enter the market; however, in practice, the implementation of this support is more like a stee-
plechase. Some traits of the mechanism required finetuning and led to the introduction of 
amendments to the initial legislative document. During the seven-year period that the entire 
first phase of the capacity mechanism has been in operation (2013–2019), 90 per cent of the 
targeted capacity (5.9 GW) was auctioned, and to date only 60 per cent of the capacity due 
has actually been built which constitutes 1.2 GW of wind and solar power as a net current 
result of the capacity mechanism. However, the industry is gaining momentum, more local 
manufacturing facilities are being built, and more national and foreign investors are showing 
interest in the scheme.
The regional-level renewable-energy support has not been very successful, although the 
framework for it has been created at the national level. However, renewables are penetrating 
regional markets where they are commercially competitive (e.g., geothermal energy in parts 
of the Russian Far East or the numerous small autonomous solar or hybrid stations substitut-
ing expensive diesel-fired power in isolated or remote areas). 
 57 Indra Overland. ‘The Siberian Curse: A blessing in disguise for renewable energy?’ (2010) 9(2) Sibirica 1
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The scale of renewables in Russia is still, however, negligible. The total 2.6 GW of 
renewable energy generation capacity built is just 1 per cent of the total Russian power ca-
pacity, and, for example, is comparable to the size of a single (though the largest) solar PV 
project in India. The slow development of renewable energy in Russia creates several risks 
for the country. First, Russian companies will fall behind in this sector just as it is growing 
exponentially internationally. Historically, the Russian photovoltaic sector was very strong 
due to, among other things, the Soviet space programmes, but now they lack a strong home 
market to buoy their development. The contrast to China is stark, with the Chinese act-
ing highly strategically to secure as big a piece as possible of the rapidly growing global 
renewables markets. One of the main tools the Chinese are using for this purpose is strong 
support for domestic deployment of renewable energy. Secondly, the limited development 
of renewables in Russia means that less-traditional fuels are available for export. Thirdly, it 
creates a risk that Russian actors are not fully aware and up-to-date on renewable energy 
developments at the global level. This is because they lack the domestic interface where they 
can gain experience and exposure. For Russia, as the world’s biggest energy exporter, this is 
a potentially serious concern.
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